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Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nuleolus and
the ore-enter
Abstrat: We show that, ontrary to the bilateral ase, for multi-sided
Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets the nuleolus and the ore-enter, i.e.
the mass enter of the ore, do not oinide in general. To do so, we prove
that both the nuleolus and the ore-enter of an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk
assignment market an be respetively omputed from the nuleolus and the
ore-enter of a onvex game dened on the set of m setors. Even more, in
the alulus of the nuleolus of this latter game only singletons and oalitions
ontaining all agents but one need to be taken into aount. These results
simplify the omputation of the nuleolus of a multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk
assignment market with large number of agents.
Keywords: multi-sided assignment games, ore, nuleolus, ore-enter
JEL Classiation: C71, C78
Resum: En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferènia del as bilateral, per
als merats multilaterals d'assignaió oneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk
assignment games, el nuleolus i el ore-enter, i.e. el entre de masses del
ore, no oinideixen en general. Per a demostrar-ho provem que donat un
m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues soluions anteriors podem
obtenir-se respetivament del nuleolus i el ore-enter d'un jo onvex denit
en el onjunt format pels m setors. Enara més, provem que per a alular
el nuleolus d'aquest últim jo només les oaliions formades per un jugador
o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simpliquen el àlul del
nuleolus d'un multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número
molt elevat d'agents.
1 Introdution
The bilateral Böhm-Bawerk horse market (Böhm-Bawerk, 1923) is a model
for a two-sided market with no produt dierentiation, and it is thus a par-
tiular ase of a bilateral assignment game. The bilateral assignment game
was introdued by Shapley and Shubik (1972) as a ooperative game model
for a two-sided market with transferable utility. In their paper, the ase of
the bilateral Böhm-Bawerk horse market is also analyzed.
In the present paper we onsider a market with an arbitrary nite number
of setors. One setor onsists of a nite number of buyers and eah one of the
remaining setors onsists of a nite number of sellers. Then eah seller oers
one unit of a good and eah buyer demands one bundle formed by one good
of eah setor. This market an be studied within the framework of multi-
sided assignment games, whih are introdued by Quint (1991). Contrary
to two-sided assignment games, multi-sided assignment games may have an
empty ore (Kaneko and Wooders, 1982). Multi-sided assignment games
have been studied, among others, by Quint (1991), Stuart (1997), Sherstyuk
(1999) and Tejada and Rafels (2010).
The partiular ase where eah buyer plaes the same valuation on all the
bundles is introdued in Tejada (2010) with the name of multi-sided Böhm-
Bawerk assignment market, extending the bilateral Böhm-Bawerk horse mar-
ket to multilateral markets. There, an analysis of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk
assignment markets is done and it is shown that the ore is nonempty and it
is ompletely determined by the ore of a onvex game played by the setors
instead of the agents.
For the lassial two-sided Böhm-Bawerk game it is well-known that the
ore is nonempty and redues to a segment. A study of single-valued solu-
tions for this game is done in Núñez and Rafels (2005), to onlude that, with-
out additional information about the bargaining apabilities of the agents,
the lassial ooperative theory seems to reommend the midpoint of the
ore segment. This assertion is supported by the fat that, among other
single-valued solutions, the nuleolus (Shmeidler, 1969) oinides with the
midpoint of the ore segment, that is, with the mass-enter of the ore.
The mass-enter of the ore was introdued by Gonzalez-Díaz and Sánhez-
Rodríguez (2007), with the name of ore-enter, as a single-valued solution
for arbitrary oalitional games.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the nuleolus and the ore-
enter of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets. We show that both
the nuleolus and the ore-enter of a multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment
market an be respetively omputed from the nuleolus and the ore-enter
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of the assoiated setors game, this being a game with many less players.
Even more, only singletons and oalitions ontaining all agents but one need
to be taken into aount in the alulation of the nuleolus of this latter
game. These results simplify the omputation of the nuleolus of a multi-
sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market with large number of agents. As a
onsequene we show that, ontrary to the ase of two-sided Böhm-Bawerk
markets, the nuleolus does not oinide in general with the ore-enter in
the ase of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets.
The struture of the paper is as follows. The preliminaries on oalitional
games and multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games are presented in
Setion 2. In Setion 3 we determine whih oalitions are to be taken into
aount for the omputation of the nuleolus of a multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk
assignment game and we also show that its nuleolus an be obtained from
the nuleolus of the related setors game. Setion 4 establishes a parallel
result for the ore-enter. An example is used throughout the paper to
illustrate both the model and our results.
2 Preliminaries and notation
A oalitional game (a game) is a pair (N, v), where N is the nite set of
players and, for all S ⊆ N , v(S) ∈ R is the worth that oalition S an
obtain without the ooperation of agents in N \ S, being v(∅) = 0. Let
|S| denote de ardinality of oalition S ⊆ N . An imputation is a payo
vetor x ∈ RN , where xi stands for the payo to player i ∈ N , that is
eient,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), and individually rational, xi ≥ v({i}) for all
i ∈ N . The set of imputations is denoted by I(v). The ore of a game
is the set of imputations that satisfy oalitional rationality and thus are
not bloked by any oalition. Formally, given (N, v), the ore is the set
C(v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N}, where
as usual x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi and x(∅) = 0. A game is balaned if the ore is
nonempty. A subgame of (N, v) is any game (N ′, v′) where N ′ ⊆ N and v′
is the restrition of v to the subsets of N ′. A game is totally balaned if the
ore of any subgame is nonempty. A game (N, v) is onvex if for all i ∈ N
and for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i} we have v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ).
The ore is an example of set-solution onept. A single-valued solution (or
point-solution) on a given set of games Γ is a rule α that assigns to eah game
(N, v) in this set Γ an eient payo vetor α(v) ∈ RN . Examples of single-
valued solutions are the nuleolus and the ore-enter. Eah one of these two
solutions selets a ore alloation that oupies a somehow entral position
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in the ore. Although for arbitrary oalitional games, these two solutions
do not oinide, they do oinide for the partiular situation of two-sided
Böhm-Bawerk markets.
2.1 Multi-sided assignment games and the Böhm-Bawerk
ase
An m-sided assignment problem (m-SAP) denoted by (N1, ..., Nm;A), is
given bym ≥ 2 dierent nonempty nite sets (or types) of agents, N1, ..., Nm,
and a nonnegative m-dimensional matrix A = (aE)E∈
∏m
k=1 N
k . With some
abuse of notation, let it be Nk = {1, 2, ..., nk} for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m. We shall
refer to the ith agent of type k as i ∈ Nk. We name any m-tuple of agents
E ∈∏mk=1Nk an essential oalition. Eah entry aE ≥ 0 represents the prot
assoiated to the essential oalition E. Again with slight abuse of notation,
we also use E to denote the set of agents that form the essential oalition.
An m-SAP is square if n1 = .... = nm.
Amathing amongN1, ..., Nm is a set of essential oalitions, µ = {Er}tr=1
with t = min1≤k≤m |Nk|, suh that any agent belongs at most to one oali-
tion in µ. We denote by M(N1, ..., Nm) the set of all mathings among
N1, ..., Nm. An agent i ∈ Nk, for some k ∈ {1, ...,m}, is unmathed under µ
if it does not belong to any of its essential oalitions. A mathing is optimal
if it maximizes
∑
E∈µ aE inM(N1, ..., Nm). We denote byM∗A(N1, ..., Nm)
the set of all optimal mathings of (N1, ..., Nm;A).
For eah multi-sided assignment problem (N1, ..., Nm;A), the assoiated
multi-sided assignment game (m-SAG) is the ooperative game (N,ωA) with
set of players omposed of all agents of all types, N = ∪mk=1Nk, and hara-
teristi funtion
(1) ωA(S) = max
µ∈M(N1∩S,...,Nm∩S)
{∑
E∈µ
aE
}
, for any S ⊆ N ,
where the summation over the empty set is zero.
It is known that the ore of a multi-sided assignment game, C(ωA),
oinides with the set of eient nonnegative vetors x = (x11, ..., x1n1 ;
...;xm1, ..., xmnm), with xki standing for the payo to agent i ∈ Nk, that
satisfy x(E) ≥ aE for all E ∈
∏m
k=1N
k
. As a onsequene, the above in-
equality must be tight if E belongs to some optimal mathing, and xki = 0
if agent i ∈ Nk is unmathed under some optimal mathing. Observe that
these two latter onditions guarantee the eieny of the ore alloations.
A partiular ase of multi-sided assignment games are multi-sided Böhm-
Bawerk markets, introdued in Tejada (2010). In these markets, eah setor
4
k, for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m − 1} is omposed of a nite set Nk of sellers, and
setor m is omposed of a nite set Nm of buyers. Eah seller ik ∈ Nk
has one good of type k to sell, with a reservation prie ckik . Eah buyer
i ∈ Nm wants to buy a bundle formed by one good of eah type, with
the singularity that, from her point of view, goods of the same type are
homogeneous. We denote by wi the value that buyer i plaes on an arbitrary
bundle (i1, . . . , im−1) ∈
∏m−1
k=1 N
k
.
Thus, an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk market (or problem) an be summarized
by a pair (c;w) where c = (c1, . . . , cm−1) ∈ RN1×· · ·×RNm−1 are the sellers'
valuations and w = (w1, ..., wnm) ∈ RNm are the buyers' valuations.
From now on, in order to simplify the analysis of the model, we will
assume that valuations of the sellers of eah setor are arranged in a nonde-
reasing way and valuations of the buyers are arranged in a noninreasing
way, i.e.
(2)
ck1 ≤ ck2 ≤ ... ≤ cknk , for all k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m − 1} , and w1 ≥ w2 ≥ ... ≥ wnm .
Given an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk problem (c;w), we denote by A(c;w) the
m-dimensional matrix dened by
(3) aE = max
{
0, wim −
m−1∑
k=1
c
kik
}
, for all E = (i1, ..., im) ∈
m∏
k=1
Nk.
Notie that, by (2), for all E,E′ ∈∏mk=1Nk,
(4) E ≤ E′ =⇒ aE ≥ aE′ .
When no onfusion may arise, we write simply A instead of A(c;w).
Then, (N,ωA(c;w)), where N is omposed of all sellers and buyers, is the
multi-sided assignment game -see (1)- assoiated to the multi-sided Böhm-
Bawerk market (c;w), whih we all the multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assign-
ment game assoiated to (c;w). From Tejada (2010), (N,ωA(c;w)) is a totally
balaned game.
For all i ∈ N, we introdue the notation Di = (i, ..., i) ∈ Rm. By (2),
the diagonal mathing µ = {Di | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is an optimal mathing, where
n = min1≤k≤m nk. Then, the ore C(ωA(c;w)) of (N,ωA(c;w)) oinides with
the following set:
(5)

x ∈ RN1+ × · · · × RNm+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x(Di) = aDi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
x(E) ≥ aE for all E ∈
∏m
k=1N
k
and
xki = 0 for all i ∈ Nk, k ∈M and i > n.

 .
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Let us dene r as the highest buyer's position that obtains a positive
prot when mathed with all the sellers in the same position r:
(6) r = max
1≤i≤n
{i | ai...i > 0} ,
with the onvention that r = 0 if all entries of A(c;w) are zero. For eah
k ∈ {1, ..,m}, agents i ∈ Nk with 1 ≤ i ≤ r are said to be ative, while
agents i ∈ Nk with i > r are alled inative. It is not diult to hek that
any mathing formed by essential oalitions with all agents ative is optimal.
In Tejada (2010), a new game dened on the set of setorsM = {1, ...,m}
is assoiated to eah multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game. The worth
in this game of a oalition S of setors is the prot that in the related market
an be obtained by the rth agents of the setors in S together with the
r + 1th agents of the setors not in S. To this end, for any S ⊆ M let us
dene ES = r1S + (r + 1)1M\S ∈ Rm, where, for eah T ⊆ M , 1T ∈ Rm
is the vetor suh that 1T (k) = 1 if k ∈ T and 1T (k) = 0 if k /∈ T . It
is important to point out that the ase where there is no r + 1th agent for
some of the setors in M\S must be treated apart. Observe that, in this
ase, ES ∈ Rm an still be dened but ES is not an essential oalition of N ,
i.e. ES /∈∏mk=1Nk. The formal denition of the setors game is introdued
next.
Denition 1 Given anm-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)),
the assoiated setors game (M,vM
c;w) is the oalitional game with set of play-
ers M = {1, 2, ...,m} omposed of all setors and harateristi funtion
dened, for eah S ⊆M , by
(7) vM
c;w(S) =
{
aES if E
S ∈∏mk=1Nk
0 if ES /∈∏mk=1Nk
if r > 0 and vM
c;w(S) = 0 if r = 0.
By denition, whenever r > 0 we have vM
c;w(M) = aDr > 0 and v
M
c;w(∅) =
0. When no onfusion may arise we write vM instead of vM
c;w.
It is shown in Tejada (2010) that (M,vM
c;w) is a onvex game and it is
strongly related to (N,ωA(c;w)). To be more preise, eah ore alloation of
the multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game is uniquely determined by a
ore alloation of the setors game. Sine payo vetors of both games orre-
spond to dierent spaes (RN
1×...×RNm versus RM ), we dene a funtion to
map payos of the setors game to payos of the multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk
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game. Given an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)), we
introdue the replia operator Rc;w : RM −→ RN1 × ... × RNm dened by
R(x1, ..., xm) = (x1, ..., xm), where xk = (
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
xk, ..., xk, 0, ..., 0) ∈ RNk for all
k ∈ {1, ...,m}. Notie that Rc;w is an injetive linear funtion.
The main result in Tejada (2010) states that if (N,ωA(c;w)) is an m-sided
Böhm-Bawerk assignment game and (M,vMA(c;w)) is the assoiated setors
game, then
1
(8) C(ωA(c;w)) =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(C
(
vM
c;w
)
),
where the translation vetor
−→
t c;w = (t11, ..., t1n1 ; ...; tm1, ..., tmnm) ∈ RN
1 ×
...× RNm is dened by
tki = max{0, ckr − cki} for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ nk,
tmi = max{0, wi − wr} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ nm.(9)
In partiular, notie that (8) and (9) imply that, for all x ∈ C(ωA(c;w)),
k ∈ M and 1 ≤ i ≤ r, we have xki = xkr + tki. Later on in the paper an
example is introdued to illustrate the above denitions and results.
In the next two setions we show that an statement analogous to (8)
holds for two singled-valued solutions that are tightly linked to the ore: the
nuleolus and the ore-enter.
3 The nuleolus
The nuleolus is a single-valued solution for oalitional games that was in-
trodued by Shmeidler (1969). For any imputation x of (N, v) and any
oalition S ⊆ N the exess of oalition S with respet to x is dened by
ev(S, x) = v(S) − x(S), and it is a measure of the satisfation of oalition
S with respet to the alloation x. Given an imputation x, we dene the
vetor λ(x) ∈ R2n−2 of exesses of all nonempty oalitions dierent from N
arranged in a non-inreasing order, so that those oalitions with a greater
omplaint oupy the rst positions in λ(x). That is, λk(x) = ev(Sk, x)
for all k ∈ {1, ..., 2n − 2} and λk(x) ≥ λj(x) if 1 ≤ k < j ≤ 2n − 2, where
{S1, ..., Sk, ..., S2n−2} is the set of all nonempty oalitions of N dierent from
N . The nuleolus of the game (N, v) is the imputation η(N, v) (we write
η(v) for short when no onfusion regarding the player set an arise) that
1
Given A ⊆ Rk and t ∈ Rk, t + A = {y ∈ Rk | y = t + x, for some x ∈ A}.
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minimizes λ(x) with respet to the lexiographi order2 over the set of im-
putations. That is, λ(η(v)) ≤Lex λ(x) for all x ∈ I(v). It is known that
the nuleolus is always a single point and, whenever the ore of the game is
nonempty, it belongs to the ore.
Mashler et al. (1979) give an alternative denition of the nuleolus
by means of a nite proess that iteratively redues the set of payos to
a singleton, alled the lexiographi enter of the game, that is proved to
oinide with the nuleolus.
Let us denote by C an arbitrary nonempty subset of oalitions of a bal-
aned game (N, v), and onsider the algorithm in Mashler et al. (1979)
restrited to oalitions in C. This restrited proedure onstruts a sequene
of oalitions Σ0C ⊇ Σ1C ⊇ · · · ⊇ Σs+1C and a sequene of subsets of payos
X 0C ⊇ X 1C ⊇ · · · ⊇ X s+1C suh that initially α0C = 0, X 0C = C(v), Σ0C = C and
∆0C = ∅ and, for t ∈ {0, ..., sC}, we dene reursively
(10)
(a) αt+1C = minx∈X tC maxS∈Σ
t
C
ev(S, x),
(b) X t+1C =
{
x ∈ X tC | maxS∈ΣtC ev(S, x) = α
t+1
C
}
,
(c) ΣCt+1 = {S ∈ ΣtC | ev(S, x) is onstant on x ∈ X t+1C },
(d) Σt+1C = Σ
t
C\ΣCt+1and ∆t+1C = ∆tC ∪ ΣCt+1,
where sC is the last index for whih Σ
sC 6= ∅. The set X sC+1 is alled the
C-lexiographi enter of (N, v). When no onfusion is possible we omit the
supersript or subsript C. By Mashler et al. (1979), if we take C to be
the set 2N of all oalitions, the 2N -lexiographi enter redues to only one
point and it is the nuleolus. For an arbitrary olletion C, the proedure is
well dened but X s+1 is not neessarily a single point, and even in that ase
it might not oinide with the nuleolus.
Like in the bilateral ase, it is easy to hek that in the ase of multi-sided
assignment games only essential oalitions, E = (i1, i2, . . . , im) ∈
∏m
k=1N
k
,
and singletons need to be onsidered in the omputation of the nuleolus
(Huberman, 1980). We denote the set of essential oalitions and singletons
by E .
As it is done in Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) for bilateral assignment
games, it an be proved
3
that, for balaned multi-sided assignment games,
the E-lexiographi enter also redues to only one point and oinides with
the nuleolus. Notie that |E| = n1 · · ·nm + n whih is muh lower than
|2N | = 2n.
2
Given x, y ∈ Rn, we say x <Lex y if there is some 1 ≤ i ≤ n suh that xi < yi and
xj = yj for 1 ≤ j < i. Also, we say x ≤Lex y if x <Lex y or x = y.
3
This proof an be provided by the authors under request.
8
In this setion we show that, in the ase of m-sided Böhm-Bawerk as-
signment games, the set of oalitions to be onsidered in the omputation of
the nuleolus an be further restrited. To this end the following lemma is
needed.
Lemma 1 Let (N, v) be a balaned game and C a subset of oalitions of N
suh that the C-lexiographi enter oinides with the nuleolus. Let F ⊆ C
be a subset of C suh that, for all S ∈ C\F , there is TS = {F1, ..., Fp} ⊆ F
and λS1 , ..., λ
S
p , c
S ∈ R satisfying that, for all x ∈ C(v),
(i) ev(S, x) ≤ ev(Fl, x), for all l ∈ {1, ..., p},
(ii) ev(S, x) = λ
S
1 ev(F1, x) + ...+ λ
S
p ev(Fp, x) + c
S
.
Then, the nuleolus η(v) oinides with the F-lexiographi enter.
Proof. To simplify the notation, let it be X t, Σt, Σt and αt for t ∈
{0, 1, . . . , s}, the elements of the C-lexiographi enter of (N, v), where s
is the last index for whih Σs 6= ∅, and X tF , Σt,F , ΣtF and αtF for t ∈
{0, 1, ..., sF }, the orresponding elements of the F-lexiographi enter of
(N, v), where sF is the last index for whih Σ
sF
F 6= ∅. We laim that, under
the onditions of the lemma, we have s = sF and, for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., s},
αt = αtF , X t = X tF and Σt ∩ F = ΣtF .
We prove it by indution on t. The ase t = 0 is trivial by the denition
of step t = 0 in (10) together with the fat that F ⊆ C and thus F ∩C = F .
Hene, assume that αt = αtF , X t = X tF and Σt ∩ F = ΣtF , for some t < s.
We shall prove that αt+1 = αt+1F , X t+1 = X t+1F and Σt+1 ∩ F = Σt+1F .
First we laim that for all S ∈ Σt there exists T ∈ Σt ∩ F suh that, for
all x ∈ X t, ev(S, x) ≤ ev(T, x). Observe that the inequality holds trivially
as an equality if S ∈ F . Hene, assume that S ∈ C\F . By hypothesis (i)
and (ii), there are TS = {F1, ..., Fp} ⊆ F and λS1 , ..., λSp , cS ∈ R suh that
ev(S, x) ≤ ev(Fl, x), for all l ∈ {1, ..., p}, and
(11) ev(S, x) = λ
S
1 ev(F1, x) + · · ·+ λSp ev(Fp, x) + cS ,
for all x ∈ X t ⊆ C(v). If it is the ase that Fl /∈ Σt for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p},
then from Σt ∩ F = ΣtF we neessarily have F1, ..., Fp ∈ ∆tF , whih by
onstrution of (10) implies that ev(F1, x), ..., ev(Fp, x) are onstant on X tF =
X t. Hene, by (11), ev(S, x) is also onstant on X t, whih ontradits S ∈
Σt. One the laim is proved, for all x ∈ X t it holds maxS∈Σt e(S, x) ≤
maxS∈Σt∩F e(S, x) and
(12) Σt 6= ∅⇔ Σt ∩ F 6= ∅.
9
Seondly, for all x ∈ X t,
max
S∈Σt
ev(S, x) ≤ max
S∈Σt∩F
ev(S, x) = max
S∈ΣtF
ev(S, x) ≤ max
S∈Σt
ev(S, x),
where the equality follows from the indution hypothesis and the last in-
equality from ΣtF = Σ
t ∩ F ⊆ Σt. Hene,
(13) max
S∈Σt
ev(S, x) = max
S∈ΣtF
ev(S, x).
Thus αt+1 = minx∈X t maxS∈Σt ev(S, x) = minx∈X tF maxS∈Σ
t
F
ev(S, x) = α
t+1
F ,
sine X t = X tF also by indution hypothesis.
Now, by (13) and X t = X tF we obtain X t+1 = X t+1F . Therefore Σt+1 ∩
F = Σt+1,F and hene Σt+1 ∩ F = Σt+1F .
Finally, by (12) we have s = sF . Thus, sine the C-lexiographi enter
of (N, v) oinides with the nuleolus and X s+1 = X sF+1F , we have that also
the F-lexiographi enter of (N, v) oinides with the nuleolus.
The above lemma is now applied to the m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assign-
ment game to see that, besides some singletons formed by last ative agents
of some setors, only essential oalitions formed by either one (or m−1) last
ative agents of some setors and m−1 (or one) rst non-ative agents of the
remaining setors need to be taken into aount to ompute the nuleolus.
Formally, given (N,ωA(c;w)) an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game, let
FN = FNm−1 ∪ FN1 be the subset of oalitions of N dened by
(14) FNm−1 =
{
ES
∣∣∣∣∣S ⊆M, |S| = m− 1 and ES ∈
m∏
k=1
Nk
}
and
FN1 =
{
ES
∣∣∣∣∣S ⊆M, |S| = 1, ES ∈
m∏
k=1
Nk
}
∪
{
{r ∈ N l}
∣∣∣∣∣E{l} /∈
m∏
k=1
Nk
}
,(15)
where reall that ES = r1S+(r + 1)1M\S . Observe that FNm−1 is omposed
of all essential oalitions (only if exist) formed by the r + 1th agent of one
setor and the rth agent of the remainingm−1 setors, whereas FN1 is formed
by all essential oalitions omposed by the rth agent of one setor, let us say
l ∈M , and the r+1th agents of the remaining m−1 setors, whenever these
essentials oalitions exist, i.e. E{l} ∈ ∏mk=1Nk, or the singleton formed by
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the rth agent of setor l otherwise, i.e. when E{l} /∈∏mk=1Nk.4 In partiular
observe that |FNm−1| ≤ m and |FN1 | = m, and hene this time |FN | ≤ 2m
whih is muh lower than |E| = n1...nm + n.
Theorem 2 Let (N,ωA(c;w)) be anm-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game.
Then the nuleolus η
(
ωA(c;w)
)
oinides with the FN -lexiographi enter of
(N,ωA(c;w)).
Proof. Consider the E-lexiographi enter of (N,ωA), whih is known to
oinide with the nuleolus η (ωA). It an be easily heked that at step t = 1
in (10) we obtain α1 = 0, X 1 = C(ωA), Σ1 = ∆1 = {S ∈ E | e(S, x) is onstant in C(ωA)}
and Σ1 = E\Σ1. Hene, we an start the algorithm of the E-lexiographi
enter with α0 = 0, X 0 = C(ωA) and
(16) Σ0 = ∆
0 = {S ∈ E | e(S, x) is onstant in C(ωA)} and Σ0 = E\Σ0.
Sine any essential oalition formed by either only ative agents or only
inative agents belongs to some optimal mathing, by (5) eah suh oalition
reeives a onstant payo in C(ωA), and hene, in the above algorithm,
Σ0 is omposed of all essential oalitions ontaining both ative agents and
inative agents, and all singletons formed by one ative agent (if there exist).
Let x ∈ C(ωA) be an arbitrary ore alloation. To prove the theorem we
will show that FN satises the assumptions of Lemma 1, i.e. for eah S ∈
Σ0\FN there is TS = {F1, ..., Fp} ⊆ FN suh that eωA(S, x) ≤ eωA(Ft, x)
for all t ∈ {1, ..., p} and eωA(S, x) = λS1 eωA(F1, x) + ... + λSp eωA(Fp, x) + cS
for some λS1 , ..., λ
S
p , c
S ∈ R whih do not depend on x. Thus, let it be S ∈
Σ0\FN . We distinguish two ases, depending on whether S is an essential
oalition or a singleton.
Case 1: S = E = (i1, ..., im) ∈
∏m
k=1N
k
.
Consider a set of setors assoiated to E dened by SE = {k ∈ M |
1 ≤ ik ≤ r}. By (16), we have ∅  SE  M . Due to the non-symmetrial
notation of buyers' and sellers' valuations, we must write separately the ase
m ∈ SE and m /∈ SE. Nevertheless, the proof of the latter ase is analogous
to the proof of the former and hene we assume m ∈ SE, whereas the ase
m /∈ SE is left to the reader. Let us also denote by E′ =
∑
k∈SE
ik1{k} +
(r + 1)1M\SE the essential oalition obtained from E by replaing agents of
4
We ould add a null agent with an arbitrarily high ost if it is a seller, or a null
agent with an arbitrary low valuation if it is a buyer, to those setors k ∈ M with
nk = r, hene ensuring the existene of the r + 1
th
agent for eah setor. In that ase,
FNm−1 =
{
ES | S ⊆ M, |S| = m− 1
}
and FN1 =
{
ES | S ⊆ M, |S| = 1
}
.
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eah setor k ∈M\SE by the r+1th agent of the same setor. Sine E′ ≤ E,
by (2) we have aE ≤ aE′ . We start proving that
(17) eωA(E, x) ≤ eωA(ESE , x).
Indeed,
eωA(E, x)
= aE −
m∑
k=1
xkik ≤ aE′ −
∑
k∈SE
xkik −
∑
k∈M\SE
xkik = aE′ −
∑
k∈SE
xkik
= aE′ − (xmr + (wim − wr))−
∑
k∈SE\{m}
(xkr + (ckr − ckik))
= max

0, wim − ∑
k∈SE\{m}
ckik −
∑
k∈M\SE
ck(r+1)


− (xmr + (wim − wr))−
∑
k∈SE\{m}
(xkr + (ckr − ckik))
= max

0, wr − ∑
k∈SE\{m}
ckr −
∑
k∈M\SE
ck(r+1) + (wim −wr) +
∑
k∈SE\{m}
(ckr − ckik)


−

(wim − wr) + ∑
k∈SE\{m}
(ckr − ckik)

− ∑
k∈SE
xkr
= max

−

(wim − wr) + ∑
k∈SE\{m}
(ckr − ckik)

 , wr − ∑
k∈SE\{m}
ckr −
∑
k∈M\SE
ck(r+1)


−
∑
k∈SE
xkr
≤ max

0, wr − ∑
k∈SE\{m}
ckr −
∑
k∈M\SE
ck(r+1)

− ∑
k∈SE
xkr
= aESE −
∑
k∈SE
xkr = eωA(E
SE , x),
where the seond and the third equalities hold by (5) and (8), the fth
equality holds adding and subtrating wr −
∑
k∈SE\{m}
ckr to the seond
term in the maximum operator, and the last inequality holds by (2). We
ontinue by distinguishing two subases.
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Case 1.1: aESE > 0.
Sine E ∈ ∏mk=1Nk, it trivially follows ESE ∈ ∏mk=1Nk. Reall that by
(16), SE  M . We now prove that, for eah k′ /∈ SE,
(18) eωA(E
SE , x) ≤ eωA(EM\{k
′}, x).
Before proving (18) observe that, sine x ∈ C(ωA), by (5) we have
x(EM ) =
∑
l∈M
xlr = aEM = w
r −
∑
l∈{1,...,m−1}
clr
and, for eah k ∈M \ {m},
x(EM\{k}) =
∑
l∈M\{k}
xlr ≥ aEM\{k} ≥ wr − ck(r+1) −
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
clr.
Combining the two above expressions we obtain
(19) xkr −
(
ck(r+1) − ckr
) ≤ 0, for all k ∈M \ {m}.
Then, for eah k′ /∈ SE,
eωA(E
SE , x) = aESE −
∑
k∈SE
xkr = w
r −
∑
k∈SE\{m}
ckr −
∑
k∈M\SE
ck(r+1) −
∑
k∈SE
xkr
= wr − ck′(r+1) −
∑
k∈M\{k′,m}
ckr −
∑
k∈M\{k′}
xkr +
∑
k∈(M\{k′})\SE
(
xkr −
(
ck(r+1) − ckr
))
≤ wr − ck′(r+1) −
∑
k∈M\{k′,m}
ckr −
∑
k∈M\{k′}
xkr
≤ max

0, wr − ck′(r+1) − ∑
k∈M\{k′,m}
ckr

− ∑
k∈M\{k′}
xkr
= aEM\{k′} −
∑
k∈M\{k′}
xkr = eωA(E
M\{k′}, x),
where the seond equality follows from the assumption aESE > 0, the third
equality is obtained by adding and subtrating
∑
k∈(M\{k′})\SE
(xkr + ckr)
and the rst inequality holds by (19). Therefore (18) indeed holds.
Next, sine E = (i1, ..., im) ∈
∏m
k=1N
k
, for any k′ ∈ M\SE we have
ik′ ≥ r+1 and thus agent ik′ ∈ Nk′ exists, whih implies EM\{k′} is also an
essential oalition, i.e. EM\{k
′} ∈ ∏mk=1Nk. Therefore, we an onsider the
following nonempty subset of FNm−1 ⊆ FN ,
(20) TS =
{
EM\{k} | k ∈M\SE
}
.
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Notie that the ardinality of TS is the same as that of M\SE . For eah
k ∈ M\SE let Fk ∈ TS denote the assoiated oalition M\{k} of TS . From
(17) and (18), we obtain that eωA(E, x) ≤ eωA(Fk, x) for all Fk ∈ TS , whih
implies that property (i) of Lemma 1 is satised for S = E, taking F = FN .
Further, we prove that also property (ii) of Lemma 1 is satised. First
of all observe that
x(ESE ) =
1
|M\SE |
∑
k∈M\SE
x(ESE )
=
1
|M\SE |
∑
k∈M\SE
(
x(EM\{k})− x(E(M\{k})\SE )
)
=
1
|M\SE |

 ∑
k∈M\SE
x(EM\{k})−
∑
k∈M\SE
x(E(M\{k})\SE )


=
1
|M\SE |
∑
k∈M\SE
x(EM\{k})−
( |M\SE | − 1
|M\SE|
)
x(EM\SE )
=
1
|M\SE |
∑
k∈M\SE
x(EM\{k})−
( |M\SE | − 1
|M\SE|
)
(aEM − x(ESE )),
where the last equality holds sine, by (5), x(ESE ) + x(EM\SE ) = x(EM ) =
aEM . Therefore,
(21) x(ESE ) =
∑
k′∈M\SE
x(EM\{k
′})− (|M\SE| − 1) aEM .
and
x(E) =
∑
k∈SE
xkik +
∑
k∈M\SE
xkik =
∑
k∈SE
xkik = x(E
SE ) +
∑
k∈SE
tkik
=
∑
k′∈M\SE
x(EM\{k
′})− (|M\SE | − 1) aEM +
∑
k∈SE
tkik ,(22)
where the seond and third equalities hold by (8) and the last equality holds
by (21). To onlude, by (22), the exess eωA(E, x) is an ane ombination
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of the exesses assoiated to oalitions of TS:
eωA(E, x) = aE − x(E)
= aE −
∑
k∈M\SE
x(EM\{k}) + (|M\SE | − 1) aEM −
∑
k∈SE
tkik
=
∑
k∈M\SE
(
aEM\{k} − x(EM\{k})
)
+
cS︷ ︸︸ ︷
aE −
∑
k∈SE
tkik −
∑
k∈M\SE
aEM\{k} + (|M\SE | − 1) aEM
=
∑
k∈M\SE
eωA(Fk, x) + c
S ,(23)
where the third equality is obtained by adding and subtrating
∑
k∈M\SE
aEM\{k} .
Therefore, as we laimed, the two requirements of Lemma 1 applied to S = E
(under the assumptions of Case 1.1) are satised for all x ∈ C(ωA), taking
F = FN and TS as in (20).
Case 1.2: aESE = 0.
In this ase, onsider the following nonempty subset of FN1 ⊆ FN ,
TS =
{
{r ∈ N l}
∣∣∣∣∣l ∈ SE and E{l} /∈
m∏
k=1
Nk
}
∪
{
E{l}
∣∣∣∣∣l ∈ SE and E{l} ∈
m∏
k=1
Nk
}
.(24)
For eah l ∈ SE let Fl ∈ TS denote the assoiated oalition of TS . Notie
that the ardinality of TS is the same as the one of SE sine, for eah l ∈ SE,
either E{l} /∈ ∏mk=1Nk and we onsider the singleton formed by r ∈ N l or
E{l} ∈ ∏mk=1Nk and we onsider the essential oalition E{l}. Notie also
that in this seond ase 0 ≤ aE{l} ≤ aESE = 0. In any ase wA(Fl) = 0 for
all Fl ∈ TS . For eah l ∈ SE ,
(25) eωA(E
SE , x) = −
∑
k∈SE
xkr ≤ −xlr = ωA(Fl)− xlr = eωA(Fl, x),
and hene
eωA(E, x) ≤ eωA(ESE , x) ≤ eωA(Fl, x),
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where the third inequality holds by (17). Hene property (i) of Lemma 1 is
satised for S = E, on the assumptions of Case 1.2, taking F = FN and TS
as in (24). Further, property (ii) of Lemma 1 is also satised. Indeed,
eωA(E, x) = aE − x(E) = aE −
∑
l∈SE
xlil −
∑
l∈M\SE
xlil
= aE − x(ESE )−
∑
l∈SE
tlil
=
∑
l∈SE
eωA(Fl, x) +
cS︷ ︸︸ ︷
aE −
∑
l∈SE
tlil ,(26)
where the rst equality holds by (8) and (5), and the last equality holds from
wA(Fl) = 0 for all Fl ∈ TS . Therefore, the two requirements of Lemma 1
applied to S = E (under the assumptions of Case 1.2) are again satised,
taking F = FN and TS as in (24).
Case 2: S = {i}.
By (16), we an assume i ∈ N l, for some l ∈M and i ≤ r. Let TS be the
following singleton of FN1 ⊆ FN ,
(27) TS = {F} =
{ {
E{l}
}
if E{l} ∈∏mk=1Nk,
{r ∈ N l} if E{l} /∈∏mk=1Nk.
By (8), we obtain
eωA({i}, x) = −xli = −tli − xlr = eωA(F, x)−
cS︷ ︸︸ ︷
ωA(F )− tli,
where the last equality holds by adding and subtrating ωA(F ). Therefore
properties (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 are satised for S = {i}, taking F = FN
and TS as in (27).
To sum up, the assumptions of Lemma 1 are satised for all S ∈ E\FN ,
to guarantee that the FN -lexiographi enter oinides with the nuleolus.
The result in Theorem 2 simplies the omputation of the nuleolus of a
multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game. Indeed, onsider for instane a
market situation with eight sellers S1, ..., S8 eah of them owning one unit of
a homogenous software good, eight dierent sellers H1, ...,H8 eah of them
owning one unit of a homogenous hardware good and B1, ..., B10 ten po-
tential buyers interested on aquiring a bundle formed exatly by one unit
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of software and one unit of hardware. Table 1 below shows the valuations
of eah agent in this three-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market, whih
translates into a 26-person ooperative game. It is straightforward to hek
that there are ve ative agents on eah side of the market, that is r = 5,
whih is marked in bold.
Table 1
Software (s) sellers Hardware (h) sellers Buyers
S1 values her good at 5 H1 values her good at 5 B1 values a s/h pair at 30
S2 values her good at 5 H2 values her good at 6 B2 values a s/h pair at 28
S3 values her good at 7 H3 values her good at 8 B3 values a s/h pair at 26
S4 values her good at 8 H4 values her good at 9 B4 values a s/h pair at 24
S5 values her good at 10.75 H5 values her good at 9.25 B5 values a s/h pair at 22
S6 values her good at 11 H6 values her good at 10.5 B6 values a s/h pair at 21
S7 values her good at 12 H7 values her good at 13 B7 values a s/h pair at 20
S8 values her good at 13 H8 values her good at 13 B8 values a s/h pair at 18
B9 values a s/h pair at 17
B10 values a s/h pair at 15
As a result of Theorem 2, in order to alulate the nuleolus of the or-
responding oalitional game (N,ωA(c;w)) with 2
26
oalitions we only have to
onsider oalitions in FN = FN1 ∪FN2 , where FN1 = {(5, 6, 6), (6, 5, 6), (6, 6, 5)}
and FN2 = {(6, 5, 5), (5, 6, 5), (5, 5, 6)}. However, the number of agents is still
high, 26, whih means that we have to solve several linear programs with 26
variables. The proedure an be simplied further by exploiting the onne-
tion between the ores of the multi-sided assignment game and its related
setors game (M,vM
c;w). To this end Lemma 1 is applied to the setors game
to show that only singletons and oalitions of size m− 1 are needed to om-
pute its nuleolus η
(
vM
c;w
)
. This fat reinfores the idea that the setors
game is a quite speial onvex game. As a onsequene, the relationship
between the nuleolus of the m-sided Böhm-Bawerk game (N,ωA(c;w)) and
that of its setors game is established.
Given the orresponding setors game (M,vM
c;w), let us onsider the sub-
set of oalitions of M dened by FM = FM1 ∪ FMm−1, where
(28) FMm−1 = {S ∈M, |S| = m− 1} ,
and
(29) FM1 = {S ∈M, |S| = 1} .
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Theorem 3 Let (N,ωA(c;w)) be an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game
and let (M,vM
c;w) be its assoiated setors game. Let also η(ωA(c;w)) and
η
(
vM
c;w
)
be the orresponding nuleolus. Then,
(a) η
(
vM
c;w
)
oinides with the FM -lexiographi enter of (M,vM
c;w).
(b) η(ωA(c;w)) =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w
(
η
(
vM
c;w
))
.
Proof. To start proving statement (a) of the theorem, reall the notation
ES = r1S+(r + 1)1M\S for all S ⊆M and let us see that (M,vM ), C = 2N
and FM are on the assumptions of Lemma 1. Let it be ∅  S  M and x ∈
C
(
vM
)
an arbitrary ore alloation of the setors game. If ES ∈ ∏mk=1Nk,
by Denition 1 and (8), it is straightforward to hek that
(30) evM (S, x) = eωA(E
S , x),
where x =
−→
t c;w+Rc;w(x). As before, let us dene for eah essential oalition
E the set SE = {k ∈M | 1 ≤ ik ≤ r}. The reader an hek that SES = S.
We distinguish two ases.
Case a.1: vM (S) > 0.
By Denition 1, vM (S) > 0 implies ES ∈ ∏mk=1Nk. Let us onsider the
nonempty set of oalitions TS = {M\{k} | k ∈M\S}, whih is a subset of
FMm−1. Observe that TS is in one-to-one orrespondene with the set dened
in (20). Now, for all k ∈M\S,
evM (S, x) = eωA(E
S , x) ≤ eωA(EM\{k}, x) = evM (M\{k}, x),
where the inequality holds by (18) and both equalities hold by (30). Fur-
thermore, from (23) and making use of (30), we dedue that evM (S, x) =∑
F∈TS
evM (F, x) + c
S
, where cS is dened in (23) . Therefore the two re-
quirements of Lemma 1 applied to S are satised, taking F = FM and the
olletion TS above dened.
Case a.2: vM (S) = 0.
Notie that, by Denition 1, either ES ∈∏mk=1Nk and vM (S) = aES = 0
or ES /∈∏mk=1Nk. In either ase, let us onsider the nonempty set of oali-
tions TS = {{l} | l ∈ S}, whih is a subset of FM1 . Observe that TS is in one-
to-one orrespondene with the set dened in (24). On the one hand, if ES ∈∏m
k=1N
k
, by (25) and (30) we easily dedue that evM (S, x) ≤ evM (F, x) for
all F ∈ TS. Furthermore, making use of (30), we dedue that evM (S, x) =∑
F∈TS
evM (F, x) + c
S
, where cS is dened in (26). On the other hand, if
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ES /∈∏mk=1Nk we have evM (S, x) = −∑k∈S xk =∑F∈TS evM (F, x). There-
fore the two requirements of Lemma 1 applied to S are satised, taking
F = FM and the olletion TS above dened.
Thus, Lemma 1 guarantees that η
(
vM
c;w
)
oinides with the FM -lexiographi
enter of (M,vM
c;w) and hene we nish the proof of statement (a).
Next we prove statement (b) of the theorem. Let X tN , ΣNt , ΣtN and αtN for
t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , sN}, be the elements in the algorithm of the FN -lexiographi
enter of (N,ωA(c;w)), where sN is the last index for whih Σ
sN
N 6= ∅. Let
also X tM , ΣMt , ΣtM and αtM for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , sM}, be the elements in the
algorithm of the FM -lexiographi enter of (M,vM
c;w), where sM is the last
index for whih ΣsMM 6= ∅.
Reall the denitions of FN and FM at (14), (15), (29) and (28), and let
us onsider the mapping Ψ : FN→ FM that assigns eah oalition of FNm−1
to a oalition of FMm−1 and eah oalition of FN1 to a oalition of FM1 in the
following way:
(31) Ψ(T ) =
{
S if T = ES ∈ FN , for some S ⊆M ,
{l} if T = {r} ∈ FN and r ∈ N l.
Observe that, by onstrution of Ψ and the denitions of FN and FM , Ψ is
injetive. Moreover, the restrition of Ψ to FN1 is bijetive, sine all S ⊆M
with |S| = 1 belong to Ψ(FN ). When there exists the r + 1th agent of eah
of the m setors, Ψ is a bijetion.
By (30) and Denition 1, for all T ∈ FN and all x ∈ C(ωA),
(32) evM (Ψ(T ), x) = eωA(T, x),
where x ∈ C(vM ) satises x = −→t c;w +Rc;w(x).
We laim that αtN = α
t
M , X tN =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(X tM ) and Ψ
(
ΣtN
) ⊆ ΣtM ,
for all t ∈ {0, ..., s}, and as a onsequene sM = sN = s. We prove it by
indution on t. For t = 0 we only have to prove that X 0N =
−→
t c;w+Rc;w(X 0M ),
whih holds by (8).
Now assume that αtN = α
t
M , X tN =
−→
t c;w+Rc;w(X tM ) and Ψ(ΣtN ) ⊆ ΣtM ,
for some t < sN . We prove that α
t+1
N = α
t+1
M , X t+1N =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(X t+1M ),
and Ψ
(
Σt+1N
) ⊆ Σt+1M .
In the rst plae, we laim that, for eah x ∈ X tM ,
(33) max
T∈Σt
N
evM (Ψ(T ), x) = max
S∈Σt
M
evM (S, x).
Indeed, by indution hypothesisΨ(ΣtN ) ⊆ ΣtM , and henemaxT∈ΣtN evM (Ψ(T ), x) ≤
maxS∈Σt
M
evM (S, x). If this latter inequality were strit, there would exist
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S ∈ ΣtM\Ψ(ΣtN ) suh that
(34) evM (S, x) > max
T∈Σt
N
evM (Ψ(T ), x) = max
T∈Σt
N
eωA(T, x),
where x =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(x) and the equality holds by (32).
Let us rst prove that neessarily S ∈ FM\Ψ(FN ). Otherwise, suppose
that S ∈ Ψ(FN ) and let T ∈ FN be suh that S = Ψ(T ). Sine S /∈ Ψ(ΣtN ),
by onstrution of (10), T ∈ ∆tN . Thus, eωA(T, x) is onstant on X tN . But
then, sine X tN =
−→
t c;w+Rc;w(X tM ) by the indution hypothesis and by (32),
evM (S, x) is also onstant on X tM . Therefore S ∈ ∆tM , whih ontradits
S ∈ ΣtM .
One established that S ∈ FM\Ψ(FN ), we neessarily have |S| = m− 1
and ES /∈∏mk=1Nk, whih implies vM (S) = 0 by Denition 1. Then, for all
k ∈ S,
(35) evM (S, x) = 0− x(S) ≤ −xk ≤ vM ({k}) − xk = evM ({k}, x).
Suppose that {k} /∈ ΣtM for all k ∈ S. Then, {k} ∈ ∆tM for all k ∈ S, i.e.
evM ({k}, x) is onstant on X tM , whih implies that xk is also onstant on X tM .
Sine |S| = m − 1 and x(M) = vM (M), we neessarily have that X tM and
X tN =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(X tM ) are omposed of a single point, i.e. t = sN = sM ,
whih ontradits t < sN . Thus it annot be the ase that {k} /∈ ΣtM
for all k ∈ S. Hene let {k} ∈ ΣtM for some k ∈ S. By onstrution of
Ψ, there exists T ′ = Ψ−1 ({k}) ∈ FN . If T ′ /∈ ΣtN , i.e. T ′ ∈ ∆tN , then
eωA(T
′, x) is onstant on X tN and, as above, by the indution hypothesis and
by (32) also evM ({k}, x) is onstant on X tM , whih ontradits {k} ∈ ΣtM .
Therefore, T ′ ∈ ΣtN , whih together with (32) and (35) implies evM (S, x) ≤
evM ({k}, x) = eωA(T ′, x), in ontradition with (34). Hene (33) holds, as
we laimed.
One the laim is proved, we show that αt+1N = α
t+1
M . Indeed,
(36)
αt+1N = min
x∈X t
N
max
T∈Σt
N
eωA(T, x) = min
x∈X t
M
max
T∈Σt
N
evM (Ψ(T ), x) = min
x∈X t
M
max
S∈Σt
M
evM (S, x) = α
t+1
M ,
where the seond equality holds by (32) and the third equality holds by (33).
Seondly, X t+1N =
−→
t c;w+Rc;w(X t+1M ) holds by (33) and (36) sine X tN =−→
t c;w +Rc;w(X tM ) by the indution hypothesis.
In the third plae, suppose that Ψ
(
Σt+1N
)
* Σt+1M , i.e. there is T ∈
Σt+1N = Σ
t
N\ΣNt+1 suh that Ψ(T ) /∈ Σt+1M = ΣtM\ΣMt+1. All this means
that T ∈ ΣtN and, sine Ψ
(
ΣtN
) ⊆ ΣtM , also Ψ(T ) ∈ ΣtM . Thus, Ψ(T ) /∈
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Σt+1M implies Ψ(T ) ∈ ΣMt+1 ⊆ ∆t+1M , and hene evM (Ψ(T ), x) is onstant
on X t+1M . We already know that X t+1N =
−→
t c;w + Rc;w(X t+1M ). Therefore,
by (32), eωA(T, x) is onstant on X t+1N , where x =
−→
t c;w + Rc;w(x), whih
implies T ∈ ∆t+1N , and hene we reah a ontradition with T ∈ Σt+1N . As a
onsequene, Ψ
(
Σt+1N
) ⊆ Σt+1M .
Finally, from the fat that X tN =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(X tM ), we know that X tN
redues to a single point if and only if also X tM redues to a single point, and
thus we onlude that sN = sM = s and, from X sN =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(X sM ), we
obtain η(ωA(c;w)) =
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(η
(
vM
c;w
)
).
Consider again the market in Table 1 and notie that to obtain the nule-
olus of the three-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (N,ωA) we essentially
have to ompute the nuleolus η
(
vM
c;w
)
of the setors game (M,vM ), whih
in this ase is the three-person game given below:
vM ({1}) = a566 = 0 vM ({1, 2}) = a556 = 1
vM ({2}) = a656 = 0.75 vM ({1, 3}) = a565 = 0.75 vM ({1, 2, 3}) = a555 = 2.
vM ({3}) = a665 = 0.5 vM ({2, 3}) = a655 = 1.75
It an be heked that η
(
vM
)
= (0.1250, 1.0625, 0.8125). This an be
done by means of the formulae provided in Moulin (1988) to alulate the
nuleolus of a three-person game. Then, from part (b) of Theorem 3 we
obtain η(wA), as it is shown in the table below, where we write η
(
vM
)
= η
for short. All this means that we have losed formulae to ompute the
nuleolus of a three-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game, no matter how
large the number of agents is.
Table 2
Ag. t R(η) η(wA) Ag. t R(η) η(wA) Ag. t R(η) η(wA)
S1 5.75 0.125 5.875 H1 4.25 1.0625 5.3125 B1 8 0.8125 8.8125
S2 5.75 0.125 5.875 H2 3.25 1.0625 4.3125 B2 6 0.8125 6.8125
S3 3.75 0.125 3.875 H3 1.25 1.0625 2.3125 B3 4 0.8125 4.8125
S4 2.75 0.125 2.875 H4 0.25 1.0625 1.3125 B4 2 0.8125 2.8125
S5 0 0.125 0.125 H5 0 1.0625 1.0625 B5 0 0.8125 0.8125
S6 0 0 0 H6 0 0 0 B6 0 0 0
S7 0 0 0 H7 0 0 0 B7 0 0 0
S8 0 0 0 H8 0 0 0 B8 0 0 0
B9 0 0 0
B10 0 0 0
Let us nally point out that statement (a) in Theorem 3 provides an
even better simpliation when the setors game onsists of more than three
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setors, that is m > 3, sine it guarantees that in the omputation of the
nuleolus of the setors game (M,vM ) not all proper oalitions of M have
to be onsidered, but only those of size 1 and m− 1.
4 The ore enter
Gonzalez-Díaz and Sánhez-Rodríguez (2007) study the ore-enter (or mass
enter of the ore) of a oalitional balaned game dened as the the mathe-
matial expetation of the uniform probability distribution over the ore. Let
U(A) denote the uniform distribution dened over the set A and E(P) the
expetation of the probability distribution P. Formally, given an arbitrary
balaned game (N, v), the ore-enter is dened as Φ(v) = E[U(C(v))].
The nuleolus of a oalitional game has a entral position in the ore but
does not neessarily oinide with its mass enter. However, for two-sided
Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets the nuleolus oinides with the mass
enter, sine it is the midpoint of the ore segment. Thus it is natural to
ask whether this property extends to multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment
markets. To this end it is neessary to simplify the omputation of the
ore-enter, sine our markets typially have many agents and there are no
easy-to-ompute formulae that provide the enter of mass of a polytope.
With this aim, we prove that, like the nuleolus, the ore-enter Φ(ωA(c;w))
of a multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (N,ωA(c;w)) and the ore-
enter Φ(vM
c;w) of the orresponding setors game (M,v
M
c;w) are related by the
injetive linear mapping
−→
t c;w + Rc;w(·). Our result is proved on the rm
basis provided by measure theory (see for instane, Federer, 1969).
Theorem 4 Let (N,ωA(c;w)) be an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game
and let (M,vM
c;w) be the assoiated setors game. Let Φ(ωA(c;w)) and Φ
(
vM
c;w
)
be the orresponding ore-enters. Then, Φ(ωA(c;w)) =
−→
t c;w+Rc;w(Φ
(
vM
c;w
)
).
Proof. Let us onsider the two metri spaes (RN
1 × · · · × RNm , dN )
and (RM , dM ), eah of them endowed with the orresponding eulidean dis-
tane. The dimension dim(P ) of a onvex polytope P is the dimension of
the minimal ane variety in whih P is ontained. From (8) we know that
C(ωA) ⊆ RN1 × · · · × RNm and C(vM ) ⊆ RM are onvex polytopes of the
same dimension k = dim(C(ωA)) = dim(C(v
M )) ≤ m− 1.
Given an arbitrary metri spae (Ω, d), the diameter of B ⊆ Ω is dened
by δ(B) = sup{d(x, y) | x, y ∈ B}. Let δN and δM denote the diameters
dened on the metri spaes (RN
1 × · · · ×RNm , dN ) and (RM , dM ). We rst
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laim that, for all B ⊆ C(vM ) ⊆ RM , we have
(37)
√
rδM (B) = δN
(−→
t c;w +Rc;w(B)
)
,
where r is dened in (6). Indeed, if x, y ∈ C(vM ) and x, y are the orre-
sponding elements of C(ωA) by (8), we have
dN (x, y) =

∑
k∈M
∑
i∈Nk
(xki − yki)2

1/2 =

∑
k∈M
∑
i∈Nk,i≤r
(xk + tki − yk − tki)2

1/2
=
(∑
k∈M
r (xk − yk)2
)1/2
=
√
rdM (x, y).
Let µN : RN
1 × ... × RNm −→ [0,+∞) and µM : RM −→ [0,+∞) be
the Hausdor outer measures of dimension k that orrespond respetively to
(RN
1 × ... × RNm , dN ) and (RM , dM ), where reall that k is the dimension
of C(ωA) and C(v
M ). By denition,
(38)
µN (A) = lim
δ→0
(
inf
{Bn}
+∞
n=1
{
+∞∑
n=1
(
δN (Bn)
)k ∣∣∣∣ Bn ⊆ RN1 × · · · × RNm , A ⊆ ∪+∞n=1Bn
and δN (Bn) < δ for all n ≥ 1
})
for any A ⊆ RN1 × · · · × RNm , and
(39)
µM (A) = lim
δ→0
(
inf
{Bn}
+∞
n=1
{
+∞∑
n=1
(
δM (Bn)
)k ∣∣∣∣ Bn ⊆ RM , A ⊆ ∪+∞n=1Bn
and δM (Bn) < δ for all n ≥ 1
})
for any A ⊆ RM . By (8) and (37), and using (38) and (39), for all B ⊆
C(vM ) ⊆ RM , we have
(40) rk/2µM (B) = µN (
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(B)).
With some abuse of notation let us also denote by µN and µM the restritions
of µN and µM to the borel sets of (RN
1 × · · · × RNm, dN ) and (RM , dM )
respetively, whih are measures by the Carathéodory Extension Theorem.
For any H ⊆ Rl, let IH : Rl −→ R be dened by IH(x) = 1 if x ∈ H
and IH(x) = 0 if x /∈ H. By denition of the Lebesgue integral, for all
measurable set B ⊆ C(vM ) ⊆ RM ,
(41)
rk/2
∫
IBdµ
M = rk/2µM (B) = µN (
−→
t c;w+Rc;w(B)) =
∫
I−→
t c;w+Rc;w(B)
dµN ,
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where the seond equality holds by (40). Moreover, for any simple funtion
s =
∑z
l=1 λlIBl : R
M → R dened on the measurable sets B1, ..., Bz ⊆
C(vM ) ⊆ RM ,
rk/2
∫
sdµM = rk/2
∫ z∑
l=1
λlIBldµ
M =
z∑
l=1
λlr
k/2
∫
IBldµ
M
=
z∑
l=1
λl
∫
I−→
t c;w+Rc;w(Bl)
dµN =
∫ z∑
l=1
λlI−→t c;w+Rc;w(Bl)
dµN
=
∫
sdµN ,(42)
where s :
∑z
l=1 λlI−→t c;w+Rc;w(Bl)
: RN
1×· · ·×RNm → R is the orresponding
simple funtion dened on the measurable sets
−→
t c;w +Rc;w(B1), ...,−→t c;w +
Rc;w(Bz) ⊆ C(ωA) ⊆ RM by the onstants λ1,...,λz respetively. For all
measurable nonnegative-valued funtion f : RM → R, by the onstrution
of the Lebesgue integral we obtain
rk/2
∫
C(vM )
fdµM = sup
s:RM→R
s simple
{
rk/2
∫
IC(vM )sdµ
M | 0 ≤ s ≤ f
}
= sup
s:RM→R
s simple
{∫
I−→
t c;w+Rc;w(C(vM ))
sdµN | 0 ≤ s ≤ f
}
= sup
s:RN
1
×...×RN
m
→R
s simple
{∫
IC(ωA)sdµ
N | 0 ≤ s ≤ f
}
=
∫
C(ωA)
fdµN ,(43)
where the seond equality holds by (42), f : RN
1 × ... × RNm → R denotes
the measurable funtion that is zero elsewhere exept in C(ωA), where it
is dened as the omposition of the inverse of the injetive linear mapping−→
t c;w+Rc;w(·) with f , and the third equality is explained as follows. By (8),
for any simple funtion s : RN
1 × ...× RNm → R suh that 0 ≤ s ≤ f there
is a simple funtion s : RM → R suh that 0 ≤ s ≤ f and s(x) = s(x) for all
x ∈ C(vM ) and x = tc;w +Rc;w(x) ∈ C(ωA). Indeed, if s =
∑z
l=1 λlIBl for
some measurable sets B1, ..., Bl ⊆ Rn we an take s =
∑z
l=1 λlIBl , where for
all l ∈ {1, ..., z} we dene Bl = (tc;w +Rc;w)−1(Bl ∩ C(ωA)).
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It is known that the k-dimensional Hausdor measure agrees with the
lassial area of an embedded submanifold of Rk, k ≤ m. Therefore, exept
for a onstant multipliative fator that oinides with the area of C(ωA) and
C(vM ), dµN and dµM are the probability density funtions of the uniform
distributions over C(ωA) ⊆ RN1×· · ·×RNm and C(vM ) ⊆ RM respetively.
Hene, by denition of the ore-enter, for all k ∈ M and all i ∈ Nk suh
that 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
tki +Φk
(
vM
)
= tki +
∫
C(vM )
xkdµ
M
∫
C(vM )
dµM
=
rk/2
∫
C(vM )
(tki + xk) dµ
M
rk/2
∫
C(vM )
dµM
=
∫
C(ωA)
xkidµ
N
∫
C(ωA)
dµN
= Φki(ωA(c;w)),
where the seond equality holds by linearity of the Lebesgue integral and the
third equality holds by (43), using f(x) = xk + tki. The ase i > r is trivial
sine inative agents get a null payo at any ore alloation.
The above result allows us to ompute the ore-enter of the three-
sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market (N,ωAc;w) of Table 1, sine we only
need to ompute the ore-enter of the three-player assoiated setors game
(M,vM
c;w). Figure 1 depits the ore of this latter game. Observe that in
order to obtain the ore-enter of C(vM
c;w) we need to ompute the area of
a bidimensional region embedded in R3. Nevertheless, a well-known result
in Measure Theory is that an invertible ane mapping f : Rn −→ Rn shifts
the Lebesgue measure µ of Rn proportionally to the absolute value of the
determinant of f , i.e. µ(f(A)) = |det(f)|µ(A) for all measurable set A ⊆ Rn.
Hene, for our purpose of omputing the enter of mass of C(vM
c;w) it sues
to alulate the enter of mass of the projetion of C(vM ) onto the (x1, x2)-
plane, sine f(x1, x2, x3) = (x1, x2, 2 − x1 − x2 − x3) is an invertible ane
mapping from R3 to R3 with the image of C(vM ) ontained in the x3 = 0
plane of R3. Notie that this latter omputation an be easily arried out
using the standard tools of integral alulus in R2, and we obtain
Φ
(
vM
)
= (0.1389, 1.0556, 0.8055).
Figure 2 below depits the projetion of C(vM ) onto the (x1, x2)-plane, to-
gether with the ore-enter Φ(vM ) and the nuleolus η(vM ) that is obtained
at the end of Setion 3.
Notie rst from Φ(vM ) 6= η(vM ) that in general the ore-enter of a
oalitional game diers from the nuleolus, even in the ase of onvex games.
Moreover, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1972) of the above setors game is
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Figure 1: The ore of the setors game assoiated to the three-sided Böhm-
Bawerk assignment game of Table 1
(0.1667, 1.0417, 0.7917). Therefore, although the Shapley value oupies a
entral position in the ore, it is in general also dierent from the ore-
enter for onvex games. Finally, as a onsequene of Theorems 2 and 4, from
Φ(vM ) 6= η(vM ) we dedue that Φ(ωA) 6= η(ωA) and thus the nuleolus of
a multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market does not oinide in general
with the mass enter of the ore.
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Figure 2: The (x1, x2) projetion of the ore of the setors game assoiated
to the three-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game of Table 1
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